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Abstract 
In 1992 a blue-ribbon group of US economists led by Michael Porter concluded 
that the US stock market-based corporate model was misallocating resources 
and jeopardising US competitiveness. The faster growth of US economy since 
then and the supposed US lead in the spread of information technology has 
brought new legitimacy to the stock market and the corporate model, which is 
being hailed as the universal standard. Two main conclusions of the analysis 
presented here are: (a) there is no warrant for revising the blue-ribbon group’s 
conclusion; and (b) even US corporations let alone developing country ones 
would be better off not having stock market valuation as a corporate goal.  
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A little over ten years ago, Michael Porter (1992) reported on the findings of a 
large research project on the US financial system sponsored by the Harvard 
Business School and the US Council on Competitiveness. This project 
comprised 18 research papers by 25 leading academic experts including Larry 
Summers, later to become Secretary of the US Treasury and currently President 
of Harvard University. The central conclusion of the overall project was 
summarized by Porter (page 65) as follows:  
 
“…the change in the nature of competition and the increasing pressure of 
globalisation  make investment the most critical determinant of competitive 
advantage.  …Yet the US system of allocating investment capital both within 
and across companies is failing.  This puts American companies at a serious 
disadvantage in global competition and ultimately threatens the long-term 
growth of the US economy.”  
    
That was 1992. Today the US model -- namely that of corporate shareholder 
wealth maximisation subject to the discipline of liquid stock markets -- is 
triumphant.  Some leading policy makers and economists are unstinting in their 
praise of this model and the financial system in which it is embedded.
2   Fast US 
economic growth since 1995, compared with the relatively sluggish performance 
of Japan and the EU, seems to have changed the perception of many economists 
about the relative effectiveness of different national economic systems. In this 
new comparative evaluation, certain economists are scathing about the European 
financial and corporate governance systems.  Kay (2003), a British economist, 
reported recently on a published symposium on the European economy in 
American Enterprise (December 2002).  He suggested that the following 
statement by Mark Steyn accurately summarized the tenor of the whole debate.  
“I find it easier to be optimistic about the futures of Iraq and Pakistan than, say, 
Holland or Denmark.  What’s wrong with the Islamic world is relatively 
straightforward.  With Europe, it’s harder to foresee any happy endings.” (page 
19).    
 
Turning to the stagnating Japanese economy and to the recent Asian crisis, in 
these pro-Anglo-Saxon model analyses, both are blamed essentially on the 
Asian way of doing business.
3  The latter, it is suggested, is marred by crony-
capitalism, which arises from the close relationship between government, 
business and the financial sector.  Similarly, the East Asian crisis is blamed on 
alleged poor corporate governance, relationship banking and lack of competition 
that are said to characterize these economies.
4        
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In view of the supposed US success in ICT technology, which is thought to be 
reflected in the observed trend increase in US productivity growth over the last 
decade, many economists have emphasized the positive role of the stock market 
in promoting technological development.
5  The huge investment in new 
technology firms in the US during the technology boom of the1990s, despite 
their zero or negative short-term profits, is regarded as an obvious refutation of 
the short-termism alleged by the stock market’s critics.  Further, there are some 
theoretical models that indicate that stock markets may be better than bank-
based systems at choosing technological winners (Allen, 1993; Allen et al., 
2004).  Other aspects of the stock market-based US financial system, namely 
incentives, rewards and punishments, are thought to be highly supportive of 
technological development. Specifically, the widespread use of stock options as 
a means of payment to those who work for new technology companies is said to 
help to align the interests of managers and employees with those of 
shareholders, leading both to greater rewards for innovation and greater social 
efficiency.  These rewards derive in part from the existence of an “exit 
mechanism” for venture capital, provided by the US financial system in the form 
of IPOs and take-overs.  Both avenues are thought to improve enormously the 
rewards for innovations, compared with other financial systems that do not have 
such mechanisms.
6 Last, but not least, the takeover mechanism on the US 
financial market, that allows for hostile acquisitions is considered to be 
particularly helpful in the selection process, that is, in being able to discriminate 
between useful technologies which increase shareholder value and those which 
do not.             
 
Larry Summers, who in the past was critical of the short-term focus of the US 
stock market, now suggests that “increasing pressure for performance for 
shareholders” has played a crucial role in the U.S. economic success.  He 
observes: “I think our financial markets should get a lot of the credit for forcing 
money out of the traditional management and entrenched corporations, and 
preventing what would have been negative internal rates of return on 
investments.” He goes on to point out that the pace at which companies mature 
has greatly increased: “On conventional estimates it used to take five years to 
build a business to the point at which venture capital would be entering. Now 
it’s less than a year.”  Similarly, Martin Feldstein, President of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research, suggests that “it may be that the nature of this 
technology is particularly favourable for the US, there are all kinds of 
facilitating characteristics here – the venture capital market, incentive-based 
rewards for the managers.” 
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Apart from these positive perceptions of the virtues of the stock market and the 
US financial system, in the adoption and diffusion of new technology, some 
scholars go further, positing an ‘end of history’ type assessment of US corporate 
model: the US system is deemed to represent the “ultimate” legal and financial 
system and all other national systems will need to converge towards it   
(Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001).  Gugler et al (2004) also emphasise 
institutional and organisational competition between different countries in the 
era of globalisation and come to the view that the US system is economically 
more efficient than others, and will therefore tend to replace the latter.  While 
they do not go as far as Hansmann and Kraakman, they do suggest that there 
will be convergence for the large multinational corporations. These will all 
become listed on the New York stock market, wherever the location of their 
headquarters, providing corporations with a cheaper external source of capital 
than that available to companies listed elsewhere. National stock markets will 
continue to exist in a number of countries, Gugler et al go on to suggest, because 
of path dependence but will find that such markets are only able to list small 
domestic companies.   
 
International financial institutions (IFIs) – the World Bank and the IMF – 
routinely recommend to developing countries (DCs) the US system of corporate 
governance as well as a stock–market based financial system.
7   Denying any 
ideological bias the IFI suggest that it is the perceived benefits of the US system 
in terms of efficient risk-sharing, allocation of resources and technological 
development, which leads them to this prescription.   
 
In this paper we critically examine the implications of these prognostications. 
We shall start with the question, whether the experience of the US economy and 
its financial system during the last ten years should lead to the complete reversal 
of the conclusions reached by Michael Porter and his colleagues in 1992. Does 
the so-called post-1995 “new” US economy constitute a conclusive proof of the 
superiority of the country’s financial system over all others?  What precisely is 
the nature of the relationship between the “new” economy, adoption of ICT 
technologies and the financial system?  Is there adequate analysis and empirical 
evidence to indicate that the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance 
outlined above is the one which all countries, including developing ones, should 
adopt?   
 
A main objective of this paper is to ask in the light of the answers to the above 
question, what kinds of corporate governance, and financial system in general 
are most likely to promote technological change, industrial and economic 
development in emerging countries. At an analytical level the paper focuses on 
two market processes which are central to stock market efficiency and       
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effectiveness, namely (a) the pricing process; and (b) the takeover mechanism. 
Relevant theory and available empirical evidence on (a) and (b) will be reviewed 
with emphasis on the experience of the last decade.  
 
It may be useful to note that for reasons of space only a few, crucial aspects of 
the financial system are being considered here, namely the incentives the 
financial system provides for those who manage the corporations to pursue 
particular objectives, and what constraints are they subject to; how efficient is 
the system in allocating resources, in promoting technological progress and 
developing new industries and firms. The question of the effects of the financial 
system on economic stability is touched upon but not fully explored here; other 
features of the financial system such as meeting consumer demand for credit, for 
household mortgages at least cost or issues related to the banking system lie 
outside the scope of this paper (Allen  et al  2004; Allen and Gale 2000).  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 examines the relationship between 
the financial system, adoption of ICT technology and the aggregate performance 
of the US economy, reviewing specifically the experience of the last 10 years. 
Section 3 broadens the research to other countries and considers the experience 
of 63 developed and developing countries, some with financial systems similar 
to those of the US and others with distinctly different ones, specifically its 
focuses on the hypothesis that stock market-based economies are particularly 
conducive to the adoption of ICT technology. Section 4 considers alternative 
analyses of mispricing on the stock market – the role of the analyst vs that of the 
managers and examines the significance of the agency problem, irrational 
exuberance and other relevant factors. Section 5 examines the implications of 
the analyses for developing country corporations and provides a brief 
conclusion.  
 
Although it is giving away the plot it may nevertheless be helpful to the reader 
to know the main conclusions towards which the analyses of this paper will 
lead: 
•  The experience of the 1990s and 2000s on the US capital market provides 
little justification for revising Michael Porter’s unfavourable verdict of 
1992 on resource allocation by these markets, although the reasons for this 
are not necessarily the same now as were then.  
•  Secondly, the analyses of this paper suggests that instead of maximising 
shareholder wealth developing country corporations should pay no 
attention at all to their market valuations. 
•  Thirdly, these corporations would be better off pursuing their traditional 
objective of increasing market share or corporate growth within the 
overall framework of the country’s industrial policy.       
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•  Thus, fourthly the stock market-based model of shareholder wealth 
maximization does not represent the ‘end of history’. In the first decade of 
the 21
st century this system has been subject to substantial corrective 
regulation but is far from certain that these regulations would greatly 
improve the efficiency of the pricing system or the take-over mechanism. 
 
II. The U.S. financial system and ICT: the case of the critics  
 
In the introductory section we have outlined what are regarded as the strengths 
of the U.S. financial system in fostering technological development, and 
specifically its role in relation to the adoption and spread of ICT.  At the 
macroeconomic level, as noted earlier, the U.S. has achieved a trend increase in 
productivity growth since 1995 which leading students of the subject attribute to 
the widespread usage of the new technology.  Initially there was some 
controversy whether the observed productivity increase was a cyclical or long-
term phenomenon.  With the passage of time this issue has been resolved and 
there is a broad consensus that the ‘new’ economy does have a faster long-term 
rate of productivity growth
8. 
 
However, the debate about the financial system is far from being over.  This is 
because the precise links between the stock market and ICT diffusion are not 
obvious, particularly in view of the boom and bust of technology stocks, both of 
which characterise the last 10 years or so of stock market history.  At an 
elementary analytical level, it may be observed that the merits of the stock 
market system in relation to technological development outlined in section I 
depend crucially on the nature of the stock market pricing process and the actual 
prices which emerge from this process.  If share prices always accurately and 
exclusively reflected the true long term expected profitability of firms (including 
the effects of new technology), the case for the virtues of the stock market 
system will have a more solid basis.  Orthodox financial economists believe this 
would indeed be the end result of a postulated pricing process based on rational 
expectations of investors who have similar beliefs about the future prospects of 
companies.  Actual prices generated by such a process of buying and selling of 
shares on the stock market, it is thought, will generate prices which obey the so-
called efficient market hypothesis. 
 
On the other hand, the prices may well be generated by an altogether different 
processes where investors base their decisions on irrational exuberance and are 
motivated by speculative profits and other psychological factors.
9 The basic 
mechanism of such an alternative pricing process is neatly described by 
Keynes’s famous beauty contest analogy.  Keynes (1936) observed in Chapter 
12 of the General Theory that       
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professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in 
which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a 
hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose 
choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the 
competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces 
which he himself finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch 
the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem 
from the same point of view.  It is not the case of choosing those which, to 
the best of one’s judgement, are really the prettiest, nor even those which 
average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest.  We have reached the third 
degree where we devote our intelligence to anticipating what average 
opinion expects the average opinion to be.  And there are some I believe 
who practise the fourth, fifth and higher degrees. (Keynes, p.156) 
 
Which of the above two views of the stock market pricing process accords more 
with the prices observed in the real world is a crucial question.  Not surprisingly, 
it is also a controversial one.  In interpreting empirical evidence on this issue, 
Tobin (1984) makes a useful distinction between ‘fundamental valuation 
efficiency’ and ‘information arbitrage efficiency’.  When financial economists 
claim that stock prices are ‘efficient’, this claim can only normally be sustained 
with respect to the latter concept of efficiency.  This simply refers to the fact that 
all information is rapidly circulated in the market, any new information is more 
or less immediately discounted by market players so that no gains are to be 
made from any publicly available information.  There is however no necessary 
correspondence between this information arbitrage efficiency and fundamental 
valuation efficiency. The latter refers to the extent to which relative share prices 
of firms reflect their relative long-term expected profits. It is the fundamental  
efficiency which is salient if stock prices are to perform their task of efficiently 
allocating resources in the economy as a whole.  There are a number of 
theoretical models as well as empirical evidence which suggest that share prices 
often depart from fundamentals for prolonged period, being influenced by 
whims, fads, fashions and irrational pessimism or exuberance.
10   
 
In the eyes of the critics of the stock market, the relationship between the new 
economy and the stock market, rather than being regarded as a virtue of the 
American financial system in facilitating the infusion of new technology, 
becomes, instead, a cause for concern.  There is a wide range of evidence which 
suggest that during this last decade US share prices have not been efficient in the 
fundamental valuation sense.  This is particularly so with technology stocks.  
Consider NASDAQ which has been the main market for technology company 
shares. In 1995 the NASDAQ index stood at 1052.1 and by 1998 the index had 
doubled in value to 2192.7. In the next 12 months, it nearly doubled again to       
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4069.3 (31 December 1999).  At its peak in March 2000, the index stood at 
5060.3 (10/03/00). Over the next 3 years NASDAQ crashed to 1335.5, less than 
a fourth of its value at its peak.  NASDAQ index stood at 2175.4 on 31 
December 2004, still less than half of its peak value, more than five years ago.  
 
This pattern of share price movement on NASDAQ looks prima facie like a 
classic share price bubble, followed by a bust.  These prices could not be 
efficient in the fundamental valuation sense, simultaneously both at the top of 
the boom and in the trough.  This is because there was ample evidence that there 
was no change of the required magnitude in the economic fundamentals during 
this period. True, the US economy had a small trend increase in long-term 
productivity growth rate, but there were no dramatic changes in the growth of 
corporate earnings and dividends. While the share prices soared, the latter 
continued to expand at their normal far slower pace (Shiller, 2000). 
 
According to the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, technology companies 
in the U.S. accounted for only 7% of total stock market value in 1990 but by 
March 2000 this share had risen to 36%, a fivefold increase. However, the share 
of employment accounted for by the technology companies rose from 6% in 
1990 to only 9% in March 2000, while their share of sales increased from 6% to 
10% in the same period.
11  Even though technology companies had faster sales 
growth than old economy companies, the latter had faster earnings growth. This 
again suggests the bubble nature of the technology stocks during the 1990s 
boom. 
 
There is further important evidence which points in the same direction. Shiller 
(2000) carefully constructed data on real price-earnings ratios in the U.S. 
economy over a long time period, from 1881 to 2000. During the 1990s stock 
market boom that began in 1992 and gathered pace during the late 1990s, the 
average real price-earnings ratio reached a value of 44.3 in January 2000.  This 
compares with a peak value of 32.6, the highest ever recorded before, reached in 
September 1929 on the eve of the Great Depression.  After this earlier peak, the 
S&P index fell by 80 per cent in the next three years and did not regain its 1929 
value until 1958.   
 
Most, but by no means all, economists regarded such valuations of technology 
stocks in the boom period to be unrealistic and as representing a stock market 
bubble.  This is perhaps brought home more clearly by taking a closer look at 
some of the individual stocks rather than the market averages.  The data for 
1995-2000 on share prices and profits of the foremost icon of the new economy, 
Amazon.com, indicate that while the share price of the company was rising 
rapidly during this period, it was making increasing losses in each successive       
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year. Another case that depicts even more vividly the irrational exuberance and 
speculative character of stock market prices for technology companies is that of 
a recent British IPO, in 2002.  The Financial Times (September 22, 2000) 
observed:   
 
It is often an amusing, if futile, exercise to read the ‘investment 
considerations’ section of a prospectus.  In the case of Arc International, the 
customisable chip designer, this ran to nine pages and advised investors that 
the company had never made, and might never make, a profit; that if it did 
that profit might not be sustainable; that revenues were likely to be volatile, 
unpredictable and subject to factors outside the company’s control; that all 
manner of dreadful things could happen that would have a material adverse 
effect on the company and its share price; and that anyone buying the shares 
would ‘experience substantial and immediate dilution in the net tangible book 
value of their investment. 
 
Investors in technology stocks are made of stern enough stuff to set aside such 
dire warnings, and the falls in the sector since the bookbuilding exercise 
began two weeks earlier.  Knowing what happened to other chip company 
floatations, they were not going to miss this one.  The issue was a great 
success and yesterday the shares more than doubled in first dealings. 
 
Shiller (2000) considered a wide range of structural factors that could justify the 
high price-earning ratios in the 1990s boom in terms of fundamentals.  He 
specifically examined the role of the internet, the baby boom and other factors 
such as the decline of inflation and the growth of mutual funds and found that 
none of them individually or collectively provided a satisfactory explanation for 
the observed rise in the average price-earnings ratio.  
 
The prices of technological stocks, apart from being speculative, are also highly 
volatile.  If NASDAQ companies are regarded as the ‘new economy’ and the 
Dow Jones corporations as the ‘old economy’, the NASDAQ indices are 
considerably more volatile than Dow Jones or S&P 500.  Share price volatility is 
however a negative feature of stock markets for several reasons.  First, it reduces 
the efficiency of the price signals in allocating investment resources.  Secondly, 
it increases the riskiness of investments and may discourage risk-averse 
corporations from financing their growth by equity issues and indeed from 
seeking a stock market listing at all. Thirdly, at the macroeconomic level, a 
highly volatile stock market may lead to financial fragility for the whole 
economy (Singh 1999, 2000).  
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Apart from this mispricing of share and share price volatility, the critics of the 
stock market- based US corporate system also call attention to what they regard 
as two other major negative features of the system.  They point out first that in 
addition to the upsides discussed in section I, there are also important downsides 
to the use of stock options as a means of payment to employees in the new 
economy.  It is now widely acknowledged that stock options in the bubble 
economy  encouraged over-reporting of earnings by managers that resulted in 
consequent over-pricing of shares.  In addition, stock options have also been 
associated with the increased income inequality in the U.S. in the last decade. 
Although this rising income inequality may be attributed to a number of factors 
(e.g. globalisation, skill biased technology), the growing use of stock options has 
also contributed.  This is particularly so in relation to the widening income gap 
between the top ten per cent and the median.
12 
 
The other big negative feature of the stock market, in the eye of the critics, 
concerns the take-over mechanism.  We saw in section I that the proponents of 
the US model regard it on the contrary as a virtue which is not available to 
Germany and Japan, thought to be much to the detriment of these two 
economies.  However, critics point to both analysis and evidence to suggest that 
the stock market selection process (via the takeover mechanism) in the real 
world is far from being efficient in the sense that it does not select for survival 
high performing firms and punish the poor performers. Evidence suggests that 
the takeover selection process in the market for corporate control works only to 
a limited extent on the basis of profitability and stock market valuation but 
operates to a much greater extent on the basis of size.  A large but relatively 
unprofitable firm has a greater chance of survival than a small profitable 
company (Singh 1975, 1992; Meeks 1977 and Hughes 1991; Tichy 2001).   
 
One issue which is raised by the extremely high valuation of the New Economy 
relative to the Old Economy stocks is that the market has supplied far too much 
capital to new technology firms that they cannot use it productively in their own 
enterprises.  To some extent it will be conspicuously consumed or fuel a take-
over binge on the part  of the New Economy firms, a good example being the 
takeover of Time Warner by America Online. Some may think that is as it 
should be – by this means the New Economy is able to increase the efficiency of 
the Old.  However, it is far from certain that the managers of the New Economy 
firms will even know how to run Old Economy businesses, let alone enhance 
their efficiency.  It is more than likely that the net effect of the New taking over 
the Old may be considerably negative for both firms and for the economy as a 
whole. 
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Similarly, Jensen (2003) drew attention to Nortel, a US corporation, to warn of 
the dangers of resource misallocation arising from takeovers by companies with 
overvalued equities. He reported that between 1997 and 2001, Nortel acquired 
19 companies at a price of more than $33 billion and paid for many of these 
acquisitions with Nortel stock, which had increased dramatically during that 
period. When the company’s price fell 95 percent in the technology stocks bust, 
all the acquisitions were written off. Jensen observed “Nortel destroyed those 
companies and in doing so destroyed not only the corporate value that the 
acquired companies – on their own – could have generated but also the social 
value those companies represented in the form of jobs and products and 
services.” 
 
To sum up, the analytical case for a stock market economy as being particularly 
conducive to fostering technical change is far from being unequivocal. The 
analysis and evidence reviewed above suggests that the stock market based U.S. 
financial system has both positive and negative features in relation to promoting 
technological change.  There is yet inadequate data to arrive at firm conclusions 
on this issue.  However, the broad controversy over the question of the 
superiority of the US stock market-based corporate system over all the others 
cannot be resolved on the basis of the experience of the U.S. alone.  It is 
necessary to consider other countries both with systems similar to those in the 
U.S. (such as the U.K., Canada, Australia, etc.) and those that possess markedly 
different systems (Japan, Germany, continental Europe).  With respect to the 
policy question as to which advanced country system, if any, is more suitable for 
developing countries to emulate, it is also necessary to consider the actual 
developmental or growth records of these countries so far.  Such quintessentially 
empirical questions are considered below in a preliminary way on the basis of 
data for a large group of emerging and developed country markets. 
 
III. ICT and the Stock Market: A Preliminary Inter-country Empirical 
Analyses 
 
This section will empirically investigate the relationship between stock market 
development and the development and usage of ICT technology on the basis of 
data for a large number of developed and emerging market economies.  The full 
sample used in this survey contains observations from 63 developed and 
developing countries on fourteen variables.  Three variables, averaged over the 
1990-1995 period, relate to economic output and growth (GDP, GDP growth 
and GDP per capita); five variables, also averaged over the 1990-1995 period, 
relate to stock market development (market capitalisation, market capitalisation 
as a percent of GDP, value traded, the inverse of the turnover ratio, and the 
number of listed companies).  ICT development and usage are represented by       
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six variables that are taken from the late 1990s: mobile phones, personal 
computers, and internet hosts, respectively, per 1000 people; high technology 
exports as a percentage of manufacturing exports, scientists and engineers in 
R&D, and a composite index of ICT development and usage.   
 
The variables relating to the level of production and its growth are a priori 
important determinants of ICT development.  Economic analysis would suggest 
for example that other things being equal, countries with higher levels of per 
capita GDP would have a higher degree of ICT development.  Similarly, we 
might expect countries with a higher rate of GDP growth should have higher 
investment rates and thus, ceteris paribus, greater ICT development.  We would 
also expect some disjuncture between the GDP per capita variable on the one 
hand and GDP growth on the other.  Theory suggests that less developed 
countries further behind the technological frontier can achieve, ceteris paribus, 
higher growth rates than countries at the frontier since they can take technology 
“off the shelf” and dramatically improve their productivity and growth.  At the 
frontier, countries are limited to more marginal improvements in technology that 
can generally be expected to have only smaller effects on the growth rate. It is 
quite possible that the ICT “revolution” is different and may have a greater 
effect on labour productivity in advanced countries but it remains to be seen 
how large this turns out to be. 
 
Regarding the stock market data, empirical studies have shown that these 
indicators are the best for revealing the extent and depth of equity market 
development.  Market capitalisation is the market value of all the companies 
traded on the stock exchange, while value traded is the total value of equities 
traded on the exchange in a given year.  The turnover ratio combines both 
variables – it is defined as the ratio of value traded to market capitalisation – and 
thus provides a measure of liquidity in the market (please note that we have used 
the inverse turnover ratio in this paper, therefore the higher the value the lower 
the turnover and liquidity).  It is claimed to be a more important variable than 
the market capitalisation to GDP ratio as a determinant of the level of 
development of the stock market since it measures the degree to which easy 
entry and exit from the market is possible.  Given the greater sophistication of 
developed country markets and in particular their more efficient and streamlined 
order and payments systems, we would expect this variable to be negatively 
related to per capita GDP (that is, the inverse turnover ratio decreases – markets 
become more liquid – as per capita GDP increases).  Market capitalisation as a 
percentage of GDP indicates the relative size of the stock market in relation to 
the national economy, but this variable is found to be a less reliable guide to the 
extent of stock market development than the turnover ratio (see Levine 1997). 
The number of listed companies is another indicator of stock market       
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development and one that is particularly important in the context of ICT 
development since it gives an indication of the number of IPOs.  
 
As noted above, the development and usage of ICT technology is reflected in a 
set of six variables.  The first three variables capture the use of mobile phones, 
personal computers and internet hosts per 1000 people in the population.  We 
would expect these variables to be highly correlated with GDP per capita.  High 
technology exports as a percentage of manufacturing exports is a rough measure 
of the sophistication of the country’s technological base.  We would expect in 
general a positive – though not necessarily linear – relationship between high 
technology exports and per capita GDP.  The relationship may not be exact 
because multinationals from OECD countries have significantly expanded their 
production platforms in emerging market economies (such as, for instance, 
Malaysia) from which they export to developed countries.  The number of 
scientists and engineers in research and development also provides a measure of 
the sophistication of the country’s technological base and can be viewed as an 
explanatory variable that helps determine the degree of ICT development.        
 
The final variable, the “ISI score”, is a composite index based on four broad 
categories measuring ICT infrastructure development and informational and 
social freedom compiled by the Information Society Index.  Table 1 presents the 
23 variables in the four main categories that comprise the index - computer, 
information, internet and social infrastructure.  The broad scope of this 
composite variable make it an excellent measure of the relative standing of 
countries in ICT technology and thus an effective dependent variable with which 
to test the determinants of ICT development. 
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Table 1. Variables included in the ISI composite index 
 









•  PCs installed per 
capita  
•  Home PCs 
shipped per 
household  









•  Percent of non-
home networked 
PCs  
•  Software vs. 
hardware spending 
 
•  Cable subscribers 
per capita  
•  Cellular phone 
ownership per 
capita  
•  Cost for phone 
call  
•  Fax ownership 
per capita  
•  Radio ownership 
per capita  
•  Telephone line 
error rates  
•  Telephone lines 
per household  
•  TV ownership 
per capita 
 




•  Home Internet 
users per 
household  
•  Education 
Internet users per 
student and 
faculty  
•  ECommerce 
spending per total 
Internet users 
 
•  Civil liberties  
•  Newspaper 
readership per 
capita 
•  Press freedom  
•  Secondary school 
enrolment  
•  Tertiary school 
enrolment 
 
Source: ISI website at http://www.worldpaper.com 
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Table 2 gives the median values of each of the main variables classified by per 
capita incomes of countries. Overall the table indicates that there is a close 
relationship between per capita income and most of the variables representing 
ICT development. There also seemed to be a generally positive relationship 
between per capita income and stock market variables.  To supplement these 
informal impression, we investigate a bit more formally the relationship between 
the variables measuring ICT development and those pertaining to stock market 
development by means of multivariate regression analysis. The latter controls 
for the effects of the level of the per capita GDP and that of GDP growth. The 
following simple linear regression model was fitted to cross-sectional data from 
63 countries including both emerging markets and developed economies.  The 
choice of countries was dictated entirely by the availability of data.  
 
ICT development indicator = β1constant 
    +   β2 GDP growth rate 
    +   β3 GDP per capita 
+ β4 number of scientists and engineers per 10,000  
+ β5 stock market capitalisation ratio  
+ β6 reciprocal of the turnover ratio 
+ β7 number of listed companies 
+ U random error term 
 
This equation was fitted successively with each of the five indicators of  ICT 
development as a dependent variable, i.e., (i) mobile phones per 1000 
population; (ii) personal computers per 1000 population; (iii) internet hosts per 
1000 population; (iv) high-technology exports as a per cent of manufacturing 
exports; and (v) ISI scores. 
 
For each of these dependent variables, four regression equations were fitted - 
one with all the independent variables listed above and the three others, each 
successively keeping only one of the three stock market variables as an 
explanatory variable and dropping the other two.  The reasons for adopting this 
procedure is that the three variables are correlated and it may be difficult to 
isolate the influence of each one when they are considered together in the same 
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The flavour of the results is best conveyed by the estimated values of the 
equation, reported in Table 3. This is the preferred model from the economic 
point of view as the dependant variable is the composite index of ICT 
development - ISI scores.  The table shows a good fit for the regression model 
with an adjusted R
2 of 0.892.  However, the only statistically significant variable 
at 5% levels or less is the ‘scientists and engineers’.  GDP per capita is 
significant at the 10% level.  None of the stock market variables are significant 
and one of them (number of listed companies) has the wrong sign.  The 
successive dropping of two of the three stock market variables, in other 
specifications, does not alter this picture. 
 
However, the full estimated linear regression equation in Table 3, despite its 
high R-square, yields poor diagnostics. The latter indicate that the Cook-
Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity rejects the homogeneous variance 
hypothesis for this data. Similarly, the RESET test indicates specification error 
in the fitted linear regression equation. Tests for the presence of multi-
collinearity was however more satisfactory. Multi-collinearity was tested by 
calculating various inflation factors (VIF) for the relevant variables. The results 
were within the acceptable range.   
Table 2. Median values for quartiles for full sample 
   Low income  Middle income Rich  Very Rich 
   (<$1566)  ($1566< x <$4181) ($4181< x <$18181) ($18181< x $36466)
GDP (US$m.)  34511.8 43264.8 82748.2 281994.8
GDP growth   4.20 3.55 5.60 1.45
GDP per capita  634.62 2959.79 9609.72 25379.28
Market Capitalisation 
(US$m.)  0.17 0.15 0.27 0.41
Market Capitalisation/GDP 
(US$m.)  3477.58 6049.75 20547.17 170494.25
World Trade Value (US$m.)  555.10 1879.67 5057.83 63143.25
Turnover Ratio (inverse)  9.0 6.3 3.3 2.4
Number of Listed 
Companies  145.6 120.8 168.8 237.8      
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Table 3. Regression Results: Dependent variable - ISI scores 
   Explanatory Variables 











as % of GDP 
Turnover ratio 
(inverse) 
No. of Listed 
Companies 
B 1238.544  -28.334  3.95E-02 6.30E-01 2.66E+00 -41.175 -4.36E-03
Std. Error  280.834  34.082  0.02 0.149 1.82 30.518  0.057
T 4.41  -0.831  1.975 4.225 1.46 -1.349  -0.076






Standard error 473.3509 











as % of GDP 
Turnover ratio 
(inverse) 
No. of Listed 
Companies 
B 971.037  -7.748  4.90E-02 6.06E-01 1.90E+00      
Std. Error  195.934  30.257  0.018 1.706 0.139     
T 4.956  -0.256  2.729 4.373 1.114     






Standard error 472.0871 











as % of GDP 
Turnover ratio 
(inverse) 
No. of Listed 
Companies 
B 1194.206  -9.122  4.34E-02 6.38E-01   -2.74E+01   
Std. Error  276.474  31.382  0.019 0.14   28.927   
T 4.319  -0.291  2.27 4.567   -0.949   






Standard error 474.528 











as % of GDP 
Turnover ratio 
(inverse) 
No. of Listed 
Companies 
B 1001.634  2.175  5.05E-02 6.09E-01      1.36E-02
Std. Error  198.244  29.512  0.019 0.15      0.057
T 5.053  0.074  2.675 4.068      0.239






Standard error 480.7237       
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To remedy the  specification fault, non-linear terms – squared terms for GDP per 
capita and for Scientists and Engineers - were added to the equation, and 
heteroscedasticity was tackled by suitable transformation so as to yield robust 
standard errors. The regression results with robust standard errors are reported in 
Table 4. All the diagnostic tests for this particular specification of the equation 
(see the bottom half of Table 4) are favourable. 
 
The results of the estimated regression equation in Table 4, which in economic, 
as well as now in statistical terms, is the favoured equation, suggest that GDP 
per capita is in fact significant at the 2% level; GDP per capita squared is almost 
significant at the 5% level but has a negative sign; the variable Scientists and 
Engineers is now significant at the 10% level; the squared term for this variable 
has a negative sign but is insignificant. Importantly, none of the stock market 
variables are significant. Overall it may be concluded from the analysis carried 
out so far that inter-country data provide little evidence of any robust 
relationship between stock market development and ICT development and 
usage.  
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ICT Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
t  P>|t| [95%  Conf.Interval] 
gdpg 12.95908  22.61307 0.57  0.571 -33.3617  59.27986 
 
gdp_pc 0.1225224  0.0363209 3.37  0.002 0.0481223  0.1969224 
 
gdppc_sq -2.32e-06  7.79e-07 -2.97  0.006 -3.91e-06  -7.20e-07 
 
scientists 0.8680147 0.2990578 2.90  0.007 0.2554226  1.480607 
 
scientists~q -0.0000695  0.0000633 -1.10  0.281 -0.0001991  0.0000601 
 
mkt_cap -0.0001092  0.0001478 -0.74  0.466 -0.0004119  0.0001934 
 
inv_turno -14.70296  20.25528 -0.73  0.474 -56.19402  26.7881 
 
num_lcomp 0.1007769  0.0900282 1.12  0.272 -0.0836375  0.2851914 
 





Regression with robust standard errors : 
 
Number of obs  =  37 
F(8, 28)    =  92.54 
Prob > F    =  0.0000 
R-squared   =  0.9528   
Root MSE    =  354.02 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of ICT- 
  Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
  F(3,  25)  =  1.72 
  Prob  >  F  =  0.1894 
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IV. The Stock Market, the US Corporate Model and Shareholder Wealth 
Maximisation 
 
As a consequence of (a) the faster long-term growth rate of output and 
productivity of the US economy over the last decade, and  (b) the supposed US 
lead in ICT adoption and diffusion, the stock market has acquired a new 
legitimacy. However, as explained earlier, these ten years have also witnessed 
the boom and bust of the share prices of technology companies. This makes it 
extremely difficult to attribute (a) and (b) to the stock market.  
 
Jorgensen (2001, 2003) has presented evidence to suggest that faster US 
productivity growth after 1995 can be attributed to a considerable extent to 
increased capital input and increased investment in IT. However, a faster rate of 
capital formation and greater investment in ICT technology could arise from 
factors which have little to do with the stock market. Jorgensen for example 
suggests that the accelerated fall in the price of semi-conductors (as a result of 
the shortening of the product cycle from 3 to 2 years due to greater competition) 
was a major factor in increased investment in IT.  Similarly changes in taxation 
could also play a role in influencing corporate investment decisions independent 
of the stock market. Further it will be appreciated that the IT technology, the 
stock market and the venture capital funds were all there before 1995 but this 
did not lead to a huge increase in investment overall or in IT. The stock market 
bubble of 1995-2000 may have influenced investment decisions but that would 
be expected to be in the direction of over-investment. It could be argued 
however, that although such investment may not be optimal from a private 
individual perspective but these nevertheless may be socially useful. This 
argument is in principle valid but there exists little systematic empirical 
evidence to support or to deny it. In addition, the stock market bust in 2000 
would have discouraged investment in IT.  
 
Jorgenson’s research also indicates that the US is not the only country to benefit 
from IT investment. Other G7 countries, including Japan have also experienced 
large increases in investment in IT. In Japan and a number of other countries, the 
stock market does not play a significant role in influencing investment decisions. 
To sum up, although during the period of the bubble the stock market may have 
played some positive role in encouraging IT investment, its net contribution is 
unlikely to have been positive for all the reasons (for example, the downsides of 
the stock options and the takeover mechanisms) examined in section 2. 
Even leading finance economists including Prof. Jensen (2003) accept that in 
contradiction of the efficient market hypothesis, during the last decade there has 
been large scale mispricing of shares on the US stock market. This raises the 
following questions: what are the reasons for the mispricing, what are its       
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consequences, what are its implications for the US corporate shareholder wealth 
maximisation model. Jensen suggests that overvaluation during the stock market 
boom arose from the agency problem and the fact that the managers were 
generally ignorant of the overvaluation problem. He believed that the market 
analysts whose exaggerated expectations managers tried to fulfil during the 
technology boom were also a part of the problem. However, he suggests that the 
corporate managers should have acted as readily against overvaluation as they 
do in relation to the undervaluation of their shares. He believes that a dialogue 
between the managers and the analysts would cure the market of inefficient 
pricing.  
 
An alternative Keynesian view is that mispricing of shares is inherent in the 
share price determination process as many stock market players base their 
investment decisions not on the basis of fundamentals but rather on speculative 
and gambling considerations. If this view is correct as extensive evidence 
presented or cited in this paper suggests, shareholder wealth maximisation is not 
a useful objective for corporate managers. With an inefficient pricing such a 
process could lead to perverse results favouring those who are inefficient rather 
than those who are efficient.  Kay (2003) therefore rightly suggests that 
corporate managers should pay no attention to the stock market at all and indeed 
the creation of shareholder value should not be a corporate goal. Corporate 
managers should concentrate on product market competition and leave the stock 
market alone. He offers the following analogy for this root and branch dismissal 
of the US corporate model: speculation in company securities, like betting on 
horses is something  which is impossible to prevent even if it were desirable to 
do so. But the horses in the race should compete against each other as best as 
they can with as little regard as possible to the punters outside (page 20). 
 
V. Implications for Developing Countries 
 
If developed country markets, which are mature, have extensive private and 
publicly provided information and are prudentially regulated but are still subject 
to such gross mispricing, emerging stock markets with greater deficits in all 
these areas, may be expected to do even worse. They are under-regulated, are 
deficient in information gathering and disseminating private or public 
organisations. As listed firms do not have long enough records to form 
reputations, it leads to arbitrary pricing of shares. The net result of all this is the 
observed high degree of volatility in prices. Further, the experience of the Asian 
crisis indicates that in a crisis the stock market is likely to interact in a negative 
feedback loop with the market for foreign currency generating basically a 
meltdown in the financial sector, if not the economy as a whole.
13 Lest this may 
be regarded as an exaggeration, recall the experience of Indonesia. Between       
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September 1997 (the time it had received an accolade of good management from 
the IMF) and December 1997, the share price in the stock market fell by 80% 
and the value of the Indonesian currency on the foreign exchange market also 
fell by about 80%, making the fall of share prices in dollar terms a huge 96%. 
For these and other reasons, mispricing of shares on third world stock markets is 
likely to be even more severe than in advanced countries. In these 
circumstances, shareholder value maximisation is not at all a sensible objective 
either from a corporate or a social perspective.  
 
At this point it may be useful to ask whether the downgrading of the stock 
market value as is being suggested here will lead to reduced technical progress, 
to the extent that venture capital markets may be regarded as essential to faster 
technological development. However, venture capital, although normally 
associated with stock markets, is not peculiar to stock-market-based systems. It 
is also found in bank-based systems and is at one level an age-old phenomenon: 
people with money providing finance to high risk businesses to gain large 
rewards when they back an enterprise that becomes subsequently successful.  
 
The high growth, high risk firms, which normally disproportionately consist of 
high technology enterprises, of the kind financed by venture capital funds, have 
usually been funded by governments in many developing and developed 
countries.  The East Asian developmental states have been prime examples of 
providing finance for such ventures.  Through an active and interventionist 
industrial policy, the Korean government obliged its firms to introduce new 
products and industrial processes through a mixture of carrots and sticks.   
However, it took the view that in the context of underdevelopment, such 
technical change is more likely to occur through the creation and expansion of 
large firms rather than through small start-ups.  The Korean government 
effectively became a co-partner with these large enterprises (the chaebol) in 
financing high risk projects, effectively socialising the risks involved (see 
further Singh 1998).  Many other governments both in rich and poor countries 
have directly assisted technological development and essentially acted as 
venture capitalists for the new technology firms. These include countries like 
France, Israel and India, all of which have been relatively successful in ICT 
development. 
 
The government of Israel has encouraged technological development through 
direct aid to the venture capital industry.  The state not only created the 
infrastructure - a high quality labour force - but also provided direct assistance 
for promoting technological change.  In 1991 the government introduced a 
special program of “technological incubators” which provided prospective 
entrepreneurs with physical premises, financial resources, tools, professional       
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guidance and administrative assistance.  Enterprises under this scheme could 
receive 85 per cent of the approved budget subject to a maximum of $160,000.  
The money was, however, given for only two years after which the companies 
had to leave the incubator and become self-sustaining (UN, 1999, p. 214). A 
similar scheme was implemented in France with the government creating twelve 
biotechnology incubators to commercialise research produced by government 
scientists. Government policies, often taking the form of direct assistance, have 
also played a major role in encouraging ICT development in Singapore and 
India.  
 
The Indian case is particularly interesting because despite very low per capita 
income and blanket import substitution policies, the country has managed to 
create a world class information technology industry.  There has been very fast 
development of the industry and its exports during the 1990s.  Indian software 
exports rose from $128 million in 1991 to $2.9 billion in 1998-99 and are 
estimated to be on the order of $4 billion in 1999-2000.  Some estimates project 
these exports to touch $50 billion in 2008 (Patibandla et al., 2000).  The industry 
has now reached a level of development where it is able to attract venture capital 
funds from abroad. Indian IT companies are able to have IPOs on the London 
Stock Exchange and on Nasdaq.  The government helped the growth, 
development and maturing of the industry through a variety of channels, the 
most important of which were: (i) creation of highly trained quality manpower at 
elite technological institutions that the government had established; (ii) having a 
selective policy to utilise multinational investment and encouraging exports;   
(iii) the government provided finance, infrastructure, legal regulation and 
marketing assistance to start-up technology firms; and (iv) the government set 
up software technology parks in Bangalore and other Indian cities. One of the 
most successful companies in India, Infosys, was set up with seed capital 
provided by government financial institutions.  The company had been refused 
funding by private banks and without government assistance it may not have 
started at all.       
 
To sum up, venture capital, IPOs and the stock market are not the only way of 
promoting ICT development. Venture capital is perfectly compatible with bank-
based systems and, indeed, in the developing country context, the government 
itself may well be the best venture capitalist. Indeed, even in the U.S. economy 
the venture capital industry makes at best a marginal contribution to total annual 
U.S. investment of around 1.5 trillion dollars. Although venture capital 
expanded several fold in the 1990s, it is estimated to have contributed at its peak 
less than 1% to the value of total investment carried out by the American 
industry (Singh, Singh and Weisse, 2000). The U.S. economic historian William 
Lazonick (2005) has persuasively argued that the stock market may not have       
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played a positive role in encouraging innovation in U.S. industry.  The sources 
of innovation and dynamism lay elsewhere, in oligopolistic competition, in 
social conditions and in the developmental role of the government. Lazonick  
observes “….in terms of investment in new knowledge with applications to 
industry, it is the United States that can lay claim to have been the world’s 
foremost developmental state. As a prime example, U.S. dominance in 
computers, microelectronics, software and data communications is impossible to 
explain without recognising the role of the government in making both seminal 
investments that developed new knowledge and infrastructure investments that 
diffused the knowledge.” 
 
In conclusion, if there are good reasons for developed country corporations to 
shun the stock market the reasons are even stronger for developing country firms 
to do so. Thus contrary to the advice from the IFIs the latter would be better off 
pursuing market share or growth within the framework of overall government 
industrial policy as they have traditionally done. The World Bank and IMF 
recommendation of essentially following the US model is seriously 
inappropriate in the developing country context. Paradoxically, developing 
country corporations are in better position to ignore the stock market than those 
of advanced countries. This is because the latter are still subject to a market for 
corporate control, whereas in developing countries such markets are at best in an 

























1 This paper draws heavily from our previous publication, particularly the 
working paper by Singh, Singh and Weisse (2002). 
2 See for example, Phelps (1999), Feldstein (1999), Summers (1999). 
3 A broadly similar corporate model and financial system prevail in. UK, 
Canada, Australia – hence the Anglo-Saxon Model. However, for differences 
between the US and UK models see Franks  and Mayer (2004). 
4 Greenspan (1998); Summers (1998). Glen and Singh (forthcoming) provide a 
critique of the Greenspan and Summers theses. 
5 For a discussion of the U.S. investment in ICT technology and its implication 
for growth of productivity see Jorgensen (2003), Oliner and Sichel (2000); For 
the role of the stock market in encouraging investment in ICT technologies see 
Feldstein (1999), Summers (1999), Jensen (2003). 
6 See Black and Gilson (1998).    
7 See for example Iskander and Chamlou (2000), Iskander et al. (1999). 
8 See further papers by Gordon (2000), Jorgensen et al (2001) and Jorgensen 
(2003). 
9 This is essentially the view taken in the modern theory of behavioural finance. 
See further Shiller (2000) and Shleifer (2000). 
10 See further Camerer (1989), Singh (1999), Shiller (2000), Shleifer (2000) and 
the  Journal of Economic Perspectives special issue on ‘bubbles’, 1990; Kay 
(2003), Jensen (2003). 
11 Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (2000). 
12 See Singh and Dhumale (2000). 
13  For a fuller discussion of these issues see Singh (1997, 1999, forthcoming)   25
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